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Abstract. In this paper we investigate whether markets with heterogeneous network 
externalities can be locked-in by old technologies even if superior technologies are available. 
Heterogeneous network externalities are present when some consumers care more about the 
size of the market share of a good than others. Interestingly, the answer depends on the 
quality difference between the old and the new technology and on whether firms compete in 
prices. Without price competition, a partial lock-in occurs if (and only if) the quality 
difference is small. In the presence of price competition, lock-in in the traditional sense 
completely disappears, although the old technology may keep some market share in some 
periods as the new technology is priced higher in equilibrium.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The value individuals attach to consuming many technological products (like telephones, 
software and hardware) or products that require maintenance depends on how many others 
are using these goods. This phenomenon is known as network externality. In the literature it 
is well-known that network externalities may create barriers to entry, preventing adoption of 
new goods, possibly of a higher quality. This can lead to the society being "locked-in" with 
an inefficient technology. A classical – although according to some (e.g. Liebowitz and 
Margolis, 1990), mistaken – example is the QWERTY standard commonly used in type - 
writers and computer keyboards (see David, 1986). Another example are nuclear power 
reactors in Europe – the dominant technology is light water, although many scientists 
consider it to be inferior to heavy water of gas graphite technology (Cowan, 1990).  
In many situations, the relative importance of network externalities for the individual 
adoption decision will differ between different consumers. An important reason for this 
differentiation is that people use the same technology in a variety of ways, and some require 
more coordination than others. In the QWERTY example, a large company with many typists 
and a high rotation of personnel will care more about the network externality than a free–
lance journalist, who uses her keyboard herself and for whom typing speed is important. In 
the existing literature, however, consumer heterogeneity with respect to network externalities 
is usually not modelled. Typically, in models with horizontally non-differentia ted good, 
consumers are either homogenous (as, e.g., in Katz and Shapiro, 1992), or they have identical 
preferences with respect to network externalities (as, e.g., in Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
In this paper, we want to study the classical question concerning the possibility of 
"lock-in" in markets where the consumers’ valuation of network externalities is 
heterogeneous across the population.1 Specific questions that we ask are: is it possible that 
the new technology is not adopted by anyone, despite its higher quality? If it attracts some 
users, under what conditions will the new technology take over the market? Does there exist 
an equilibrium with both technologies present? We also investigate the market structure of 
the market when the technology is sponsored  by two strategically acting sellers, who choose 
prices to maximize long - run profits.  
To this end, we study a model with two products, an old, inferior good and a new, 
superior good. We assume that quality can be objectively measured and that  consumers 
differ in their relative valuation of quality vis-à-vis the network externality. This means that 
if A is of a higher quality than B, then everyone regards A to be better than B, but for some 
people the quality difference is relatively more important than for others. Consumers decide 
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in every period which good to buy solely on the basis of the present (net) utility.2 We study 
the questions outlined above in two different environments. First, in Section 2, we address 
the pure demand side effect by considering technology adoption in a world where firms are 
passive. Second, in Section 3, firms play a game with infinitely many periods and 
simultaneously choose prices in every period to maximize long-run profits. In every period 
market shares adjust to their equilibrium values given the prices that are chosen in that period 
and the market share at the beginning of that period. Since prices influence future profits only 
through their impact on market share, we can use the concept of Markov equilibrium. 
Markov strategies specify optimal actions for each value of a state variable. In our case, they 
specify optimal prices for each value of the market share at the beginning of a period.  
 Our basic results are as follows. When firms are passive (technologies are not 
sponsored)  two equilibrium market shares may emerge: if the difference in qualities is larger 
than a certain threshold value, the new technology will be the unique technology in the 
market. If the quality advantage is lower than this threshold value, the two technologies co-
exist in the market and the entrant will have the smallest market share.  It is easy to see why 
the new technology has to have the whole market if it is to be the dominant technology: if 
both quality and market share of one technology are higher, all consumers derive more utility 
from this product than from the other and hence, will switch to this technology. The possible 
emergence of two equilibrium market shares and the discontinuous jump of market shares  at 
the threshold value are the main results of this section.  
 Section 3 examines whether these results continue to hold when technologies are 
provided by a price-setting incumbent and entrant. Like in the basic model the market share 
of the entrant positively depends on his quality advantage. However, some qualitatively new 
phenomena may arise. When the quality difference is large, the entrant will initially set a low 
price and take over the market. In the following periods, he will set the highest price that will 
ensure that the incumbent will stay out of the market forever.3 When the quality difference 
takes intermediate values, the entrant will still take over the market in the first period, but 
then he will not try to keep the whole market, since that would require setting an unprofitably 
low price. Therefore, both technologies coexist, and the new technology dominates.      
When the quality advantage is low, a pure strategy Markov equilibrium does not exist. 
It may still be optimal for the entrant to take over the market, but then it will not be optimal 
to set a price that would allow him to keep a large market share forever. Similarly, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
1 de Palma and Leruth (1996) also model heterogeneous network externalities, but as quality 
differences don't play a role in their analysis, they cannot address the issues we are interested in. 
2 Hence, in our model the consumers are not "locked –in" by their past purchases directly, but instead 
by the present choice of other consumers. This is in contrast to some of the existing literature (see for 
instance Katz and Shapiro 1986, 1992). 
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incumbent will not keep a large market share if he has one. Only mixed strategy equilibria 
exist, in which sometimes the incumbent, and sometimes the entrant, will have a large market 
share. 
Interestingly, with price competition the traditional lock-in result—namely that an 
inefficient technology will continue to dominate the market despite the existence of a 
superior one—disappears  as an equilibrium phenomenon. The entrant will always, no matter 
what the quality difference—have a large market share at some point, but he may not find it 
optimal to keep it, especially when the quality difference is low. This means that the old 
technology may re-appear in the market and be bought by those consumers who consider the 
quality difference to be too small to warrant the price difference.  
We also analyze welfare properties of the different equilibrium configurations. Social 
welfare is maximized when the new technology has the whole market. For high values of 
quality difference this is the outcome both with and without price competition. When quality 
difference takes on intermediate values, some of the market is given away to the old 
technology in the presence of price competition, which implies a lower welfare. For low 
values of q the welfare implications are not clear.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the pure demand 
effects due to heterogeneous network externalities. Section 3 introduces price competition 
and section 4 examines the welfare implications. Section 5 concludes. Most proofs are given 
in the appendix.  
 
2. A demand-driven model 
 
In this section we describe the demand side in detail and show whether and if so to what 
extent a new technology will be adopted in markets with heterogeneous network 
externalities. We explicitly show how equilibrium market shares depend on the quality of 
both technologies.  
As explained in the introduction, consumers care about quality and about network 
externalities, but the relative importance of these factors in the individual adoption decision 
varies across consumers. Let )(1 tuq  and )(
0 tuq denote the utilities that consumer q  derives 
from consuming the new and the old technology, respectively,  in period t. These utilities are 
given by   
txqtu qqq +-= 1
1 )1()( , 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3 For other models of strategic pricing in markets with network externalities, see, for example, Katz 
and Shapiro (1992), Bental and Spiegel (1995) and, more recently, Cabral et al. (1999). 
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)1()1()( 0
0
txqtu -+-= qqq , 
where 0 1  qq >  are qualities of new and old technologies, respectively, 1,0Îtx  is the 
market share of the new technology in period t, tx-1  is the market share of the old 
technology, and q  is the relative weight that consumer q  places on the popularity, compared 
to quality. We assume that q  is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].  
 At the moment the new technology enters the market, the whole market belongs to 
the old technology and consumers decide which technology to choose. We define an 
equilibrium to be a situation in which every consumer makes her preferred choice given the 
choice of the other consumers, i.e., no consumer would individually like to switch to another 
technology. For certain parameter values, multiple equilibrium market shares are possible. 
We define a stable equilibrium given an initial markets share of 1-tx  as an equilibrium that 
would result as the outcome of a (loosely formulated) dynamic process according to which 
consumers who are not satisfied with their choice given 1-tx  switch. The final outcome of 
the adjustment process depends on the quality advantage of the new technology, 
001 ³-= qqq , and on the initial market share 1-tx .  For simplicity, we assume that this 
consumer adjustment process takes place instantaneously.  Figure 2.1. below illustrates the 
process for low  values of q. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are three equilibria here, out of which 1xx t =  and 1=tx  are stable. If q is low 
and 21 xx t <- , the process will result in an equilibrium market share 1xx t = . Otherwise, 
1=tx . When q is large, 1x  and 2x disappear and the only equilibrium is 1=tx . Since the 
new technology has initially no market share, in our case 201 0 xxx t <==- .  
Proposition 1 describes equilibrium market shares of the new technology. 
 
 
 xt 
 xt-1 
   1 
  x1     x2 
 xt = xt-1 
 Figure 2.1. 
   1 
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Proposition 1 The stable equilibrium market shares given 1-tx =0 are   
  1=tx     if  223 -³q    
 
4
8)1(1 2 qqq
x t
-+-+
=   if  223 -<q .  
Proof.  In order to have an equilibrium coexistence of technologies, it must be true that there 
exist a 1*0 <<q  such that  
qqx t =+- )21(*q                (1) 
and all consumers with *qq <  (and only those) choose the new technology. Since è is 
uniformly distributed on [0,1], xt must be equal to the q  of  the indifferent consumer. 
Substituting for è in (1) we get a quadratic equation which we can solve for xt. 
0)1(2 2 =-++- qxqx tt               (2) 
Basically, two possibilities emerge: 
a) If 08)1( 2 £-+ qq , or 223 -³q , (2) has no stable solution. In this case, the only 
equilibrium is xt = 1.  
b) If 08)1( 2 >-+ qq ,  or 223 -<q ,  (2) has two solutions: 
4
8)1(1 2
1
qqq
x
-+-+
=  and 
4
8)1(1 2
2
qqq
x
-+++
= ,  
where 2xx t =  is an unstable equilibrium. If initially, 21 xx t <- , the equilibrium that emerges 
is 1xx t = .                                                   ///  
 
Figure 2.2. shows the equilibrium market share of the new technology as a function of 
its quality advantage.    
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The equilibrium market share of the new technology will be either 1, or less then 0.29. 
Which value of the equilibrium market share will emerge depends on the quality difference. 
1 
0.29 
  
 
q 
223 -
Figure 2.2 
 xt 
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A larger quality advantage leads to a larger market share, which is quite intuitive. However, 
the market share does not increase continuously with the quality difference: there is a critical 
value, q 223-= ,  such that if qq <  the equilibrium market share is less than 0.29, and 
if  qq > , the new technology gains the whole market. This is a consequence of network 
externalities, which cause a critical mass effect: once the new technology has a sufficiently 
large market, it will be preferred by all types of consumers, not only those with a taste for 
quality, but also those with a preference for popularity.  
Moreover, as 0>q  we see that the better technology always has some market share. 
When the quality advantage is small, the market will still be dominated by the old 
technology. If the quality advantage is large enough, however, there will be no technological 
lock-in: the new technology will drive out the old one.  
 
3. Price competition  
 
In this section we analyze the case where each technology is put on the market by one seller. 
Initially, there is only one seller in the market, the incumbent, who provides the old 
technology. Our analysis begins in the period in which an entrant appears, offering for sale a 
higher quality technology. This implies that 00 =x . A consumer è will choose the good that 
will give him or her higher net utility, in period t, given by  
             tt
t pxqptu 111
1 )1()( -+-=- qqq , 
 tt
t pxqptu 000
0 )1()1()( --+-=- qqq , 
where prices of the entrant and the incumbent are denoted by tp1  respectively 
tp0 . 
In every period sellers set a price in order to maximize their total discounted profits, 
given the pricing strategy of the competitor. That is, a seller i maximizes  
å
¥
=
- P=P
1
1
t
t
i
t
i d ,  
where d is a discount factor and tiP  is profit in period t. Assuming that there are no costs of 
producing technology, per-period profits are    
 t
tt xp11 =P     for the entrant,  
 )1(00 t
tt xp -=P     for the incumbent. 
 
Our notation equates demand to a market share, which implies that the market is covered. 
This is obviously true if prices are zero, since in that case everyone derives at least 
nonnegative utility from any technology. However, if prices are positive, it may happen that 
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for some consumers prices exceed the gross utility from using a technology. It may also 
happen that sellers will find it optimal to serve only a part of the market. Since our interest 
lies in the structure of the market, that is its division between consumers of different 
technologies, and not in its size, we want to keep the total amount of consuming individuals 
constant. Hence, to make sure that the market will be covered in every period, we put 
restrictions on the qualities of both technologies. We assume that they are both contained in 
the interval [0.5, 3]. We show in the proofs of subsequent propositions that when this 
restriction is satisfied, the market is always covered in equilibrium. 
 To understand why this restrictions is needed, consider a seller who does not face any 
competition. Note that consumers who derive all utility from network externalities cannot 
value any technology at more than one. On the other hand, consumers who put all weight on 
quality value any technology only by its quality. If quality is very low or very large, the 
valuations of these two extreme types of consumers differ significantly. Then, it is optimal to 
sell only to consumers with highest valuation. Hence, the restriction on qualities makes sure 
that valuations of different consumers are not too far apart, and that it is not optimal to leave 
part of the market uncovered in exchange for a higher price.      
We begin our analysis with obtaining per-period demand functions in subsection 3.1. 
We assume now that the market is covered, that is that seller can only loose some of the 
market to the other seller. This implies that having derived the demand for the new 
technology, we immediately know the demand for the old technology. In subsection 3.2 we 
describe equilibrium pricing strategies of sellers.  
 
3.1. Entrant's demand function  
Here, we show how the market share, or demand, of the entrant depends on prices and initial 
market share. To calculate demand, we use the same definitions about stable equilibrium 
market shares as in Section 2. Since 3,5.0 01 ££ qq , and since by assumption the new 
technology is of higher quality, we can  restrict attention to 30 ££ q .  
The following lemma characterizes the demand function of the entrant.   
 
Lemma 1 Suppose that 30 ££ q . The demand function of the entrant is   
(i) If qpp tt +£ 01 , then  
· 
4
)(8)1(1 01
2 tt
t
ppqqq
x
+--+-+
=    
if 
4
1
1
+<-
q
x t      and 8
)1( 2
01
+-+> qqpp tt  , or 
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if  
2
1
4
1
1
+<£+ -
q
x
q
t      and qxqxpp tt
tt ++-+> -- 1
2
101 )1(2  
· 1=tx  otherwise. 
 
(ii) If qpp tt +³ 01 , then  
· 
4
  )1(8)3(3 01
2 tt
t
ppqq
x
-+-+++
=     
if  1<q , 
4
3
1
+³-
q
x t  and 18
)3( 2
01 -
++£ qpp tt  , or 
  if  
4
3
2
1
1
+<£+ -
q
x
q
t  and 1)3(2 1
2
101 -++-£ -- tt
tt xqxpp  
· 0=tx  otherwise. 
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 and can be found in the appendix. 
                         /// 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates lemma 1. It shows the market share of the entrant as a function of the 
price of his technology.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When tp1  is relatively small, the only equilibrium market share of the entrant is 1=tx . 
When tp1  is relatively large, the only equilibrium is 0=tx . At intermediate values of 
tp1  
two demand values are possible depending on the initial market share. Note that there is 
no tp1  such that both solutions are interior, that is both demand values are between 0 and 1: if 
qpp tt +< 01 , then 4/)1( +< qx t  or 1=tx ,  and if qpp
tt +> 01 ,  4/)3( +> qx t  or 
0=tx .  
 
xt 
p1t 
1 
 p0
t+q-(q+1)2/8 
 
 p0
t+(q+3)2/8-1 
 
 p0
t+ q 
Figure 3.1 
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From figure 3.1 we can obtain the demand function for a given 1-tx . It consists of  the 
upper curve up to a point 1
~p  and the lower curve to the right of this point.  The value of 1
~p  
at which demand is discontinuous depends positively on the initial market share and is given 
by:    
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
î
ïï
ï
ï
ï
í
ì
<+-++
+<<+-++-
+
<<
+
++-+
+<+-+
=
-
---
---
-
       
4
3
    if                       1
8
)3(
4
3
2
1
     if        1)3(2
2
1
4
1
     if        )1(2
 
4
1
               if                      
8
)1(
~
1
2
0
11
2
10
11
2
10
1
2
0
1
  x
qq
p
q
x
q
xqxp
q
x
q
qxqxp
q
x
q
qp
p
t
t
ttt
t
ttt
t
t
t
  
Figure 3.2. shows an example of the demand function for a given 1-tx : 
  
      Figure 3.2.     
  
Note that in comparison to Section 2, two additional stable equilibrium market shares are 
possible: no entry of the new superior good, 0=tx , and a large market share of the entrant 
that is smaller than 1. Case (i) of lemma 1 is a generalization of Section 2: the entrant's 
market share is either small or equal to 1, depending on the initial market share and prices 
that are chosen. Both new types of equilibria occur in case (ii) of lemma 1 when the price of 
the new good exceeds its quality advantage, which is obviously not possible when prices are 
not included in the model and q > 0. It is no longer true that a higher quality good cannot 
have a market share larger than 0.5  and lower than 1. Its price may be so much higher than 
that of the other good that potential customers will not find it worthwhile to buy it.        
 
xt 
p1
t 
1 
 p0
t+ q 
1
~p
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Clearly, a large initial market share is an advantage: at given prices in the two – 
equilibrium range, a larger initial market share results in a larger eventual demand. This is a 
consequence of network externalities: a large market share increases the value of the good to 
consumers, who are therefore willing to pay a higher price. 
 
3.2. Markov Equilibrium prices and outcomes.   
In this subsection we describe equilibrium pricing strategies for both sellers. As firms set 
prices to maximize total profits,  å
¥
=
- P=P
1
1
t
t
i
t
i d , and as (from lemma 1) profits in period t 
are equal to ),,( 10111 -=P t
tt
t
tt xppxp  and )),,(1( 10100 --=P t
tt
t
tt xppxp , the impact of 
today's prices on future pay-offs is only through the impact on today's market share. 
Combined with the fact that the number of periods is infinite, this allows us to use the notions 
of  Markov strategies and Markov equilibrium. In our context, a Markov strategy specifies, 
for each seller, a pricing strategy such that price in any period depends only on the market 
share at the beginning of that period in a way that is independent of time.     
 Propositions 2 to 5 describe Markov equilibrium strategies and outcomes for different 
values of the quality difference: 1³q , 15.0 <£ q , 5.0ˆ << qq and qq ˆ0 <£ , where 
3477.0ˆ »q . Together these propositions give a full characterization for the case where 
3,5.0 01 << qq . Interestingly, the propositions show that lock-in, in the sense of the old 
technology being able to keep a large market share forever, cannot be an equilibrium 
phenomenon under price competition for any value of the quality difference. For high levels 
of q the entrant will be able to take over the whole market forever. For smaller values of q, 
the entrant will take over a large market share after some time, but gives the incumbent at 
least for some periods at least a small market share back. 
 Proposition 2 characterizes Markov equilibria for 1³q . When 1³q , Lemma 1 tells 
us that two types of market share can arise in any period: 4/)1(1 +<- qx t  or  11 =-tx . 
Hence, these components of the strategies are most relevant.  
 
Proposition 2.  Suppose 3,5.0 01 ££ qq  and 1³q . Then, the strategies  
ïî
ï
í
ì
=
<+-=
-
-
1          if                                          1
1          if                         
8
)1(
1
1
2
1
t
tt
x
x
q
q
p     
 00 =
tp           for all  1-tx  
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form a Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome is then 1=Tx  for all tT ³ . 
Moreover, this is the unique equilibrium outcome.   
 
Proposition 3 describes Markov equilibria for 15.0 <£ q . When 1<q , two types of market 
share can arise in any period: 4/)1(1 +<- qx t  or  4/)3(1 +³- qx t . This will be therefore 
the initial market share in most periods.  
 
Proposition 3.  Suppose 3,5.0 01 ££ qq  and 15.0 <£ q . Then, the strategies 
ïî
ï
í
ì +-=
                                              
8
)1( 2
1
q
q
q
p t  
4
)3(
        if
4/)3(        if
1
1
+³
+<
-
-
q
x
qx
t
t
         
00 =
tp           for each 1-tx  
form a Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome is then 1=Tx  for all tT ³ . 
Moreover, this is the unique outcome in all Markov equilibria.  
 
Propositions 2 and 3 show that when the quality of the new technology is much higher, it is 
optimal for the entrant to take over the market and then set the maximum price at which he 
will keep it. The incumbent will be driven completely out of the market already in the first 
period, and he will not be able to come back. Surprisingly, this result does not depend on the 
discount factor. With a large quality advantage, the entrant is able to set a relatively high 
price and still take over the market immediately, hence taking over is optimal even if only the 
current profits matter.  If the entrant cares also about future profits, there is an additional gain 
from taking the whole market early on and enjoying the benefits of an installed consumer 
base.   
The difference between the two propositions mainly lies in the price the entrant can ask in 
order to keep the whole market and can be understood by looking at Figure 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 q2<1
   q1>1 
 0 1 q 
    u(è) 
Figure 3.3. 
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Here, )(qu  is defined as the difference in gross utilities that consumer q can derive in  
period t from both technologies if 1=tx , that is 
qqqqu +-=--+-= qqqqq )1()1()1()( 01 . 
In other words, u(è) says how much more consumer è is willing to pay for the new 
technology, in comparison to the old one, if everyone else buys the new technology. The bold 
lines in the figure represent  u(è) for two different values of q , 11 >q  and 12 <q .  
In equilibrium, the entrant cannot ask, from any consumer, a price which exceeds the 
price of the incumbent by more than the additional gross utility that the new technology 
offers in comparison to the old one. That is, the difference in prices cannot be larger than the 
lowest gross utility difference. Hence, )(min01 qq upp
tt £- . If 1³q , u(è) reaches a 
minimum for consumers with 1=q  and it equals 1. Hence, the entrant's price cannot exceed 
the incumbent's price by more than 1. If 1<q , the gross utility difference  reaches a 
minimum for consumers with 0=q  and equals q . Therefore, the price of the entrant cannot 
exceed the price of the incumbent by more than q .  
 
We will now turn to an analysis of the case where the quality advantage of the entrant is 
smaller than 0.5 and we will show that in this case both sellers will coexist in the market. 
Propositions 4 and 5 deal with these cases. As in Proposition 3, 4/)1(1 +<- qx t  and 
4/)3(1 +>- qx t  are the most relevant initial market shares. Let   
( ) ( ) 3477.03
2
238241
3
238241
3
1
2
1
2
7ˆ
2
3/1
3/1
»
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
+
+
+++-=q . 
 
Proposition 4.  Suppose that 3,5.0 01 ££ qq  and 5.0ˆ <£ qq . Then, the strategies  
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form a Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome is then xxt ˆ=  for all Tt > , where 
1ˆ
4
3 <<+ xq .  Moreover, this is the unique equilibrium outcome.  
 
When the quality difference takes on intermediate values, as in Proposition 4, the entrant will 
still take over the market in the first period, but will not keep it. The two technologies will 
coexist, with more than three quarters of consumers buying the new  technology. The reason 
is that when the quality difference is not so high, the entrant would have to set a low price to 
keep the whole market. It is optimal to set a somewhat higher price at the expense of giving 
away part of the market.   
For q closer to 0.5, the equilibrium prices are such that the incumbent is not able get 
back a large market share from the entrant. When q  is closer to qˆ , he is able to do it, but 
does not find it optimal. He would have to set a price much below the equilibrium price, and 
a large market share would not compensate for it. Moreover, in the following period the 
entrant would get a large market share again. This makes it optimal for the incumbent to 
accept a low market share in exchange for a higher price and the absence of a price war.       
Note that in spite of the fact that the entrant has both a higher quality and a higher 
market share, some consumers buy the old good. This is not possible without price 
competition. More surprisingly, the few consumers who buy  the old, low quality technology 
are precisely those who care most about quality. To understand this, observe that when 
1<q , and 4/)3(ˆ +> qx , the market share advantage of the entrant is higher than the 
quality advantage, that is qxx >-- )ˆ1(ˆ .4 As a consequence, "popularity loving" consumers 
are willing to accept a higher price difference (and still buy the new good) than "quality-
loving" consumers. The consumers with a high valuation for quality play therefore the role of 
catalyst. Initially, the entrant sets a low price, and all consumers buy the new technology: the 
"quality lovers" because its quality is higher, and "popularity lovers", because the "quality 
lovers" provide benefits in terms of network externalities. After getting a  high market share, 
the entrant sets a high price to exploit his established base. Then, for the "quality lovers" the 
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quality difference does not justify the difference in prices. Therefore, they switch back to 
consuming the old good. On the other hand, there are now enough "popularity lovers" 
consuming the new technology, who can provide network benefits for each other. Thus, they 
are willing to accept a higher price difference.  
 
Finally, we consider the case when q is small. 
 
Proposition 5. If 3,5.0 01 ££ qq  and qq ˆ0 <£ ,  there does not exist a pure strategy 
Markov equilibrium.   
 
When the quality difference is small, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium, where 
both technologies will coexist over time, but neither seller will be able to keep a large market 
share in the long run. In a  mixed strategy equilibrium sometimes the entrant, and sometimes 
the incumbent will dominate the market.  
 
4. Social welfare  
 
We now compare social welfare, measured in terms of social surplus, in situations with and 
without price competition. The social welfare consists of two components: consumer surplus 
and sellers’ profits. In the case of unsponsored technology prices and profits are zero, so the 
welfare equals consumer surplus. With price competition, net consumer surplus is equal to 
gross consumer surplus minus the amount paid to sellers. Since the sellers’ revenues are their 
profits, total social welfare is equal to the gross consumer surplus and depends only on the 
equilibrium market shares.  
In subsections 4.1 and 4.2 we analyze the social welfare in the cases without and 
without price competition, respectively, and in subsection 4.3 we compare the two.  
 
4.1. Social welfare without price competition 
 When everyone consumes the old technology, the total surplus is the area below the 
line connecting 0q and 1 (see figure 4.1). If everyone consumes the new technology, the total 
surplus is the area below the line connecting 1q  and 1. If the market share of the new 
technology is 10 << x , total surplus is given by the area below the bold lines. To see why, 
note that the line connecting 1q  and x  shows, for every consumer type, the utility derived 
from consuming the new technology if its market share is x . Similarly, the line connecting 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
4 This is easy to see as qqxxx >+>-=-- 2/)1(1ˆ2)ˆ1(ˆ . 
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0q and x-1  shows utility derived from the old technology. We see now that consumers with 
x<q  prefer the new technology, and their total surplus is the area below the left segment of 
the bold line, while the remaining consumers prefer the old technology, and achieve total 
surplus equal to the area below the right segment of the bold line.  
Clearly, the social welfare is maximized when everyone uses the new technology. Hence, if 
in equilibrium the new technology is the only one, society benefits from its introduction. 
However, when in the equilibrium the new technology has only a small market share, it is not 
so obvious that welfare has increased. The consumers who use the new technology in the 
equilibrium derive now more utility from its quality, but they lose a large part of the network 
externality. The remaining consumers lose a part of network externality and do not gain 
anything.  
The net effect can be found by analyzing figure 4.1. The welfare gain due to higher 
quality equals to the area of the triangle Aqq 01 , and the welfare loss from decreased network 
externality is the area between 1, A, B and x-1 . Hence, the welfare change is 
)1(5.05.05.0)1(1)1(1 00101 -=-=-=- -- qxxxqSSSS xqBqqxABAqq . 
Since the new technology can only have a small market share if 223 -<q , the 
welfare change is negative. Figure 4.2 shows how social welfare in equilibrium depends on 
the quality difference, given that the quality of the old technology, 0q , is fixed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  q 223-
Welfare 
Figure 4.2.   
 q1 
  x 
 1-x 
  x 
 q0 
 1 
 u(q) 
 0  1  q 
Figure 4.1 
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 B 
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As q  increases, social welfare changes discontinuously. Initially it decreases, because 
the market share of the new technology increases, which leads to decrease of network 
benefits. When q reaches its critical value, social optimum is achieved in which the new 
technology gets the whole market.         
 
4.2  Social welfare with price competition.  
In this case social welfare equals gross consumer surplus, which depends on the equilibrium 
market shares. We know from section 3 that in the presence of price competition two types of 
pure strategy equilibrium outcomes can arise: 1=x  if 5.0³q  or 14/)3( <<+ xq  if 
5.034.0 << q . For lower q no pure strategy equilibrium exists, which makes the welfare 
analysis in that case very difficult.  
Figure 4.3. illustrates social welfare in the two possible pure strategy equilibria:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in figure 4.1., a line connecting a quality value on the left side of the diagram and a 
market share value on the right side shows, for each consumer type, the utility derived from 
consuming the technology of that quality and market share. The area below the bold line 
represents social welfare when x  is large. In this case, the new technology is being used by 
consumers with high q, and since its market share is x, the indifferent consumer has 
x-= 1q . This consumer gets the same net utility from both technologies, but since the 
prices are not equal, gross utilities differ, which causes the jump in the bold line.   
Similarly to the previous subsection, total surplus is maximized when 1=x . In an 
equilibrium with 14/)3( <<+ xq  some consumers have a higher, and some a lower gross 
surplus in comparison with the situation before the introduction of the new technology. Those 
who in the equilibrium use the old technology lose a large part of the network benefits, equal 
to the area of the triangle BAq0 . The remaining consumers benefit from higher quality, but 
lose a part of the network externality. The net change in their gross surplus equals the 
 q1 
  1 
 q0 
  x 
 1-x 
u(q) 
 0  1  q 
 1-x 
Figure 4.3. 
  A 
 B 
   C 
D 
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difference between the areas of triangles CBD and D1x. Hence, the total welfare change is 
equal to 
.5.1)5(5.0)1(
2
)1()1(
22
12 23
2
01
1)1()1(1 010010
xxqxx
xxqxxxqqxxq
SSSSSS ACqqxqxxqqABqDxCBD
-++-=-
----++
--
-+
=
=--=-- --
 
Since the lowest 94.0»x ,5 the welfare change is positive.  
Figure 4.4. shows how welfare in the equilibrium depends on the quality difference, if 
0q is fixed, for 34.0>q .  
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
The market share of the new technology increases as the quality difference increases. 
Since for high x social welfare increases with x, it implies that welfare depends positively on 
q. When q reaches 0.5, the new technology has the whole market in the equilibrium, which 
maximizes social welfare.  
 
4.3. Welfare comparison 
We can now compare the social welfare that is achieved in equilibrium with and 
without price competition, given the quality difference.  
i) If 5.0³q , the equilibrium outcome is the same in these two cases. Everyone buys the new 
technology, and the social welfare is maximized.                             
ii) If 5.0223 <<- q , the new technology is the only one if there is no price 
competition, but it has less than the whole market with price competition. Since 1=x  is 
socially optimal, price competition leads to a lower welfare.  
iii) If 223 -<q , in the equilibrium without price competition the new technology has a 
small market share. With price competition, there is no pure strategy equilibrium, and the 
                                                                 
5 This will be the market share of the entrant if q=0.34 
Welfare
 q  0.5  0.34 
   Figure 4.4. 
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new technology has sometimes a small, and sometimes a large market share. It is difficult to 
say in which case the welfare will be higher.  
 
5. Conclusions   
 
We have examined the adoption of technology in a market with heterogeneous network 
externalities where consumers have different relative valuations of both network size and 
quality. In section 2 we considered the case of unsponsored technology, and in section 3 we 
analyzed the implication of each of the two technologies being supplied by a strategic seller. 
We found that the market outcomes depend on the quality advantage of the new technology. 
In general, the higher the quality difference, the higher the market share of the new 
technology, both in the case of sponsored technology and in the case of unsponsored 
technology. However, when firms are passive the results are more clear-cut. There is a 
critical value such that if the quality difference is larger, the new superior technology will be 
used by the whole market, and if the quality difference is lower, the old technology remains 
dominant. Interestingly, with price competition it is not possible that the old technology stays 
dominant in every period, not even when the quality advantage is zero. That is,  the 
traditional lock-in results does not hold under price competition.  
This is not to say that it is always better for society to have price competition. There 
are values of the quality difference such that without price competition, the whole market 
will be served by the superior technology, whereas under price competition, the old and the 
new technology co-exist as the price difference between the two technologies is so large that 
some consumers prefer to buy the old technology. This means that under price competition 
social welfare may be lower.  
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Appendix  
Proof of Lemma 1. In order to have an equilibrium with coexistence of technologies, there 
must exist a 1*0 <<q  such that  
qppqx ttt --=-- 01)12(*q .    (A.1) 
There are two cases to be distinguished. If qpp tt +< 01 , there may be an interior equilibrium 
*q  such that all consumers with *qq <  (and only those) consume the new technology. If, 
on the other hand, qpp tt +> 01 , there may be an interior equilibrium *q  such that all 
consumers with *qq <  (and only those) consume the old technology. We consider the two 
cases in turn. 
 
Case I : qpp tt +£ 01 . Since è is uniformly distributed on [0,1], xt must be equal to the q  of  
the indifferent consumer. Substituting for è in (A.1) we get a quadratic equation which we 
can solve for xt. 
.0)()1(2 01
2 =+--++- tttt ppqxqx    (A.2) 
Basically, two possibilities emerge: 
a) If 
8
)1( 2
01
+-+£ qqpp tt , (A.2) has no stable solution. In this case, the only equilibrium 
is xt = 1.  
b) If 
8
)1( 2
01
+-+> qqpp tt , (A.2) has two solutions: 
4
)(8)1(1 01
2
1
tt ppqqq
x
+--+-+
= ,  
4
)(8)1(1 01
2
2
tt ppqqq
x
+--+++
= .  
If initially 21 xx t <- , the equilibrium that emerges is 1xx t = ; if 21 xx t ³- , 1=tx . The value 
of 2x  depends on 
tp1 . From the expression for 2x  it follows that 21 xx t >- , if and only if, 
4/)1(1 +>- qx t  and qxqxpp tt
tt ++-+£ -- 1
2
101 )1(2  (when 2/)1(1 +>- qx t , the latter 
condition follows from qpp tt +£ 01 ) . Otherwise, 21 xx t <- .  
Case II: qpp tt +> 01 . Since è is uniformly distributed on [0,1], xt must be equal to the 1-q  
of  the indifferent consumer. Substituting for è in (A.1) we get a quadratic equation which we 
can solve for xt: 
 0)1()3(2 01
2 =-+-++- tttt ppxqx .   (A.3) 
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Following a similar procedure as in Case I we have the following two possibilities: 
a) If 1
8
)3( 2
01 -
++³ qpp tt , (A.3) has no solution and the solution is unstable. In this case, 
the only stable equilibrium is xt = 0.  
b) When 1
8
)3( 2
01 -
++< qpp tt , two equilibria are possible depending on  1-tx : if 
4
  )1(8)3(3 01
2
1
tt
t
ppqq
x
-+-+-+
<- , which is true when 4/)3(1 +<- qx t  and 
1)3(2 1
2
101 -++-> -- tt
tt xqxpp , then 0=tx . This is always the case when 1³q . 
In the reverse case and if 1<q , 
4
  )1(8)3(3 01
2 tt
t
ppqq
x
-+-+++
=  
4
3+> q .  ///
          
Proof of Proposition 2. From Lemma 1 we know that the entrant’s market share can never be 
14/)1( <<+ txq , so we do not consider these initial market shares. For the remaining 
initial market shares we show that it is possible and optimal for the entrant to take over the 
whole market in the first period and to keep it subsequently, no matter what the price of the 
incumbent. Hence, this will be the unique equilibrium outcome. From that it will follow that 
the entrant's strategy described in the proposition is the optimal response to the incumbent's 
equilibrium strategy. Demonstrating that the incumbent's strategy is an optimal response to 
the entrant's equilibrium strategy will complete the proof.    
First, we prove that it is always possible and optimal for the entrant to take over and 
keep the whole market. That is, it is neither optimal to give some market share away to the 
incumbent, nor to leave some part of the market uncovered. We first show that taking over 
(or keeping) the market maximizes the entrant's current profits, or total profits if 0=d , for 
any tp0 , and then we extend the argument to total discounted profits when 0>d .  
We consider relevant initial market shares in turn:   
i) 0=d  and 11 =-tx . If in equilibrium 1=tx , then no consumer prefers the old good to the 
new good, that is 101 +£
tt pp , and all consumers derive a positive utility from consumption, 
that is 0)1( 11 ³-+-
t
t pxq qq  for all q . This requires 11 =
tp , which implies 11 =P
t . We 
show now that 11 =
tp  is optimal.  
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If 11 £
tp , then 1=tx  and 11 <P
t . If 11 >
tp , only consumers with 
t
t
xq
pq
-
-£
1
11q  get 
nonnegative utility. As tx  cannot be larger than the market, 2
)(4 11
2
11
t
t
pqqq
x
---
£ ,  
and profits cannot be larger than 
2
)(4 11
2
11
1
t
t pqqqp
---
 . When 11 >
tp , this expression 
is always smaller than 1,  provided that 31 £q .
6 Hence, 11 =
tp  is optimal.  
ii) 0=d and 4/)1(1 +<- qx t . To take over the market, the entrant must set 
8/)1( 201 +-+£ qqpp
tt , and in addition 11 £
tp  so that everyone gets positive utility in 
the equilibrium.  The profit is then }1 ,8/)1(min{ 201 +-+=P qqp
tt . We show that 
}1 ,8/)1(min{ 201 +-+= qqpp
tt  maximizes current profits. If tp1  is lower than this 
minimum, the market share is also 1, and the profits are lower, hence this is not optimal. 
Suppose tp1  is higher. We consider now two cases:   
a) 8/)1(}1 ,8/)1(min{ 20
2
0 +-+=+-+ qqpqqp
tt . Then, the profit is at most7  
÷
ø
öç
è
æ +
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ +
-+<
+--+-+
=P
4
1
8
)1(
2
)(8)1(1 2
0
01
2
11
qq
qp
ppqqq
p t
tt
tt , 8  
which is lower than =P t1 8/)1(
2
0 +-+ qqp
t .   
b) 1}1 ,8/)1(min{ 20 =+-+ qqp
t . Now, the profit is 
2
)(4 11
2
11
11
t
tt pqqqp
---
<P  ,   
which is lower than 11 =P
t .   
This shows that when 4/)1(1 +<- qx t , it is optimal to take over the market.  
We have shown that when current profits are being maximized, 1=tx  for all relevant 
1-tx . If 4/)1(1 +<- qx t , the entrant's total discounted profits are 
                                                                 
6 If 215.0 <£ q , 2
)11(4
2
11
1
tpqqqtp
---  achieves a maximum, equal to ( )( ) 12/14/211 <- qqq , at 4/2111 qqtp -= . If 
312 ££q , the maximum is achieved at 11 =
tp  and equals 1. For other values of  q1 other p1 may be optimal, 
and the market may be not covered.   
7 This is the share of consumers who prefer the new good to the old good. An additional restriction is 
that all consumers who buy the new good should get positive utility from it. Hence, the market share 
may be even smaller.  
8 The per-period profit function is decreasing when qqtp -+> 6/2)1(0  (which is always true if 
26.032 »->q , since in that case  06/2)1( <-+ qq ),  and 8/2)1(01 +-+> qq
tptp . As tp1  approaches  
8/
2
)1(0 +-+ qq
t
p , the market share converges to 4/)1( +q .  
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)1/(}1 ,8/)1('min{ 201 dd -++-+=P qqp , where 0'p  denotes the equilibrium price of 
the incumbent when 4/)1(1 +<- qx t .  No other strategy can give higher total profits. To see 
this, note that under the proposed strategy current profits are maximized, and the future per-
period profits equal 1. Since per-period profits can never be higher than 1, any other strategy 
will result in lower profits. This shows that taking over the market in the first period and 
keeping 1=tx  forever is the entrant's optimal strategy, independently of the strategy of the 
incumbent and discount factor. Thus, this must be the outcome in any equilibrium.  
As 00 =P
t  for any tp0   it is easy to see that 00 =
tp  is (one of the optimal) 
incumbent's strategies. Hence, both players play an optimal response.    /// 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. From Lemma 1 we know that the entrant’s market share will never be 
4/)3(4/)1( +<<+ qxq t , hence we do not consider these cases. For remaining initial 
market shares we first show that if 0=d  it is always optimal for the entrant to take over the 
market and keep it, and we use this result to show that the proposed strategies form an 
equilibrium if 0=d . Next, we show that they also form an equilibrium if  0>d , and that 
the outcome in this equilibrium is the only outcome that can arise.  
Suppose 0=d . We consider relevant initial market shares in turn: 
i) 0=d  and 4/)3(1 +>- qx t . The entrant must set qpp
tt +£ 01  to have 1=tx , to make 
sure that all consumers prefer the new good to the old one, and to ensure that all consumers 
must have positive utility, t
t xqp qq +-£ 11 )1(  for each q . When 11 ³q  (which is the case 
if 5.0>q  and 5.00 ³q ) and 1=tx ,  this requires 11 £p . Therefore, to keep the whole 
market, the entrant must set }1 ,min{ 01 qpp
tt += . The  profit is then }1 ,min{ 01 qp
tt +=P . 
Lower tp1  will not increase the market share beyond 1, thus it is not optimal. We check now 
if it may be optimal to set a higher tp1 . We have to consider two cases.  
a) qpqp tt +=+ 00 }1 ,min{ . Then, the current profit is at most
9 
1
8
)3(
   if           
4
)1(8)3(3 2
01
01
2
11 -
++£
-+-+++
=P qpp
ppqq
p tt
tt
tt . 
Taking first and second order derivatives we see that if qp t 210 -³ , which is always the 
case if 5.0³q  and 00 ³
tp , this profit is maximized when qpp tt += 01 . Then, 1=tx  and  
qp tt +=P 01 .  
                                                                 
9 see footnote 7. 
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b) 1}1 ,min{ 0 =+ qp
t  Then, if 31 <q , the profit is less than 1. 
10 This shows that when 
11 =-tx , }1,min{ 01 qpp
tt += and keeping the whole market is optimal.   
ii) 0=d  and 4/)1(1 +<- qx t . This proof is similar to the case 4/)1(1 +<- qx t  and 
0=d  of Proposition 2.  
The above argument shows that for any 1-tx ,  the strategy at which the entrant takes 
over and keeps the market, is a best response to any incumbent’s strategy if 0=d . As the 
incumbent always earns 0 independently of his strategy, 00 =
tp  is an optimal response for 
him. Hence, the proposed strategies form an equilibrium if 0=d . The argument showing 
this is also an equilibrium if 0>d  is similar as in proposition 2 and therefore omitted.  
We now show that no other equilibrium outcome can arise. (So far, we have only 
shown that there exists at least one equilibrium). In every period 4/)1( +< qx t  or  
4/)3( +> qx t , and moreover 14/)3( <<+ txq  is never optimal, because it gives lower 
current and the same future profits as 1=tx . Hence, possible outcomes are   
i) 4/)1( +< qx t  for every 1-tx  
ii) 1=tx  for every 1-tx  
iii) 4/)1( +< qx t  if 4/)3(1 +>- qx t and 1=tx  if  4/)1(1 +<- qx t  
iv) 4/)1( +< qx t  if 4/)1(1 +<- qx t  and 1=tx  if 4/)3(1 +>- qx t  
We have just shown that the outcome (ii) exists. We consider now other outcomes. 
Denote by 1'p  and 0'p  prices when 4/)1(1 +<- qx t , and by 1''p and 0'p  prices when 
4/)3(1 +>- qx t .  
Ad. i) Here, the entrant has always a small market share, and his profits are at most11  
 
4
)'(8)1(1
1
1 01
2
11
ppqqq
p
t
t +--+-+
-
=P
d
. 
Assuming that the market share of the entrant must stay small, this profit is maximized at12  
 e++-+= 8/)1(' 201 qqpp
t , or e--++= qqpp t 8/)1(' 210 , 
where e  is a small positive number. Consider now the incumbent. His profits are  
 
4
)'(8)1(3
1
1 01
2
00
t
t ppqqqp
+--++-
-
=P
d
. 
                                                                 
10 See footnote 6.   
11 See footnote 7   
12 See footnote 8 
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Taking the first order condition we see that this profit is decreasing at 
e--++= qqpp t 8/)1(' 210 . Hence, at optimum e--++< qqpp
t 8/)1(' 210 .  
Therefore, the only equilibrium prices can be  
 00 =
tp  and e++-= 8/)1( 21 qqp
t . 
At these prices, the entrant’s total profits will be 
   ÷
ø
öç
è
æ +
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ö
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æ +
-
-
=P
4
1
8
)1(
1
1 2
1
qq
q
d
, 
which is lower than what he can earn by taking over and keeping the market,   
 
d
d
-
+
++-=P
1
}1,''min{
8
)1( 0
2
1
qpq
q . 
In the same way we show that outcome (iv) is not possible.  
Ad. iii). Here, the market share follows a cycle: .etc.,..0,1,0 21 === ++ ttt xxx
13 Total 
discounted profits are equal to  
 1} ,8/)1('min{
1
2
021
+-+
-
=P qqp
d
d
. 
If, on the other hand, the entrant keeps 1=tx , his discounted profits will be  
 }1 ,''min{
1
1
01 qp +-
=P
d
. 
We know that 5.0}1,''min{ 0 ³+qp , 1}1,8/)1('min{
2
0 £+-+ qqp  and 5.0)1/( £+dd . 
Then, it follows that 1} ,8/)1('min{
1
2
021
+-+
-
=P qqp
d
d
 }1 ,''min{
1
1
0 qp +-
£
d
.
 This shows that no other outcome than 1=tx  for every 1-tx  can arise in the 
equilibrium. This completes the proof.                   /// 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. From Lemma 1 we know that the entrant’s market share will never be 
4/)3(4/)1( +<<+ qxq t , hence we do not consider these cases. For the remaing initial 
market shares we first show that the proposed strategies form an equilibrium when 0=d . 
Next, we show that they also form an equilibrium when  0>d , and we use the restrictions 
on 1q  and 0q  to show that in this equilibrium the market is covered. Subsequently, we show 
that no other outcome with a covered market can arise in a Markov equilibrium, and since it 
is always optimal to cover the market, no equilibria with the market not covered exist.   
Suppose 0=d . We consider different initial market shares in turn.   
                                                                 
13If 4/)3(1 +>- qtx , the only possible 4/)1( +< qtx is 0=tx  
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i) 0=d  and 4/)1(1 +<- qx t . The proof is similar to the case (i) of Propositions 2 and 3.  
ii) 0=d  and 4/)3(1 +>- qx t . We initially assume that the market is covered and look at 
the entrant and the incumbent in turn. 
a) The profit function of the entrant is 
ï
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ï
ï
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ì
-++£<+
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From this we derive the optimal response of the entrant. First, note that both 
18/)3( 201 -++> qpp
tt  and qpp tt +< 01  cannot be optimal. When 
18/)3( 2010 -++££+ qppqp
ttt , the profit function is concave and decreasing at the 
upper boundary of the domain. Hence, two optima are possible: 14 
· if qp t 210 -< , there is an interior solution, given by the first order condition,  
0
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Solving for the optimal price, we get 
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66)3()3(12)3(12 0
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t pqqqpp
+-+++-++
=    
· if qp t 210 -³ , there is a corner solution at the lower boundary: qpp
tt += 01 . 
b) The profit function of the incumbent is 
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Note that it is never optimal to set qpp tt -³ 10 , or 
tp0  lower than 
                                                                 
14 We can see now the main difference between 5.0³q  and 5.0<q . When 5.0³q , qtp 210 -³ for 
any 00 ³
tp , and  it is always optimal to set qtptp += 01 and keep the whole market. When 5.0<q , 
qtp 210 -<  and an interior solution with less than the whole market for the entrant is possible. 
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e-+-+ 8/)3(1 21 qp
t for any 0>e . The profit function is discontinuous at 
8/)3(1 210 +-+= qpp
tt .15 For qppqp ttt -<£+-+ 10
2
1 )3(1 , the profit function is 
concave if ( )8/)3(1
3
4 2
10 +-+> qpp
tt , and convex otherwise. Moreover, it is decreasing 
at the upper boundary of its domain, qp t -1 .  Therefore, two optimal values can arise: 
  
· an interior solution, given by the first order condition 
0
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tt
ttt
t
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,  
provided that the function is in its concave range. Solving for the optimal price, we get 
18
66)1()1(12)1(12 1
22
1
0
tt
t pqqqqqpp
-+--+---
= ; 
· a corner solution at the lower boundary,  e-+-+= 8/)3(1 210 qpp
tt , where e  is 
a small positive number.   
It is easy to check that if the optimal price of at least one of the sellers is a corner 
solution, there is no equilibrium. Therefore, if there exist equilibrium prices, they must be 
both interior solutions to the optimization problem. It follows from the above analysis, that 
for the interior solutions to be optimal, the equilibrium prices must satisfy:  
i) qp t 210 -< , so that the interior solution of the entrant is optimal; 
ii) At the equilibrium price of the entrant, the incumbent must earn more if he plays the 
interior solution than in the corner solution. That is,  
( )
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ppqqqpqqq
pqqqpqq
ttt
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The left side of this inequality has been obtained by substituting the interior optimal 
price of the incumbent into his profit function. Solving this inequality, we get the following 
condition for an equilibrium: 
4
27)27(185
1
qqq
p t
+++--
£  
                                                                 
15 t0P approaches ( )( ) 8 )3(1218 2)3(11 21 +-+<-+-+ qpqqtp t  as tp 0 approaches 8 2)3(11 +-+ qtp  from above. 
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Substituting the incumbent's optimal response function into the entrant's optimal 
response function, solving for tp0  and 
tp1  and eliminating solutions with negative prices we 
obtain the following equilibrium:  
100
9389)9(23463 22
0
++-+---
=
qqqqq
p t ,  
100
9389)11(1763 22
1
++++-+
=
qqqqq
p t .  
 
We have to check whether the conditions which make sure that these are interior 
solutions are satisfied. It is easy to check that in the equilibrium the incumbent’s price 
satisfies qp t 210 -< .  The entrant's price must satisfy 
4
27)27(185
100
9389)11(1763 22
1
qqqqqqqq
p t
+++--
<
++++-+
= .  
Solving for q , we obtain the following condition for the existence of an equilibrium:  
( ) ( ) 3477.03
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+
+
+++-=> qq   
 
If q  satisfies this condition, there exist equilibrium prices such that for both sellers the 
interior solution to the profit maximization problem is optimal. Hence, if qq ˆ> and 0=d , 
the proposed strategies form an equilibrium.  
We show now that the strategies described in the proposition form an equilibrium if  
0>d . Suppose that the entrant plays the equilibrium strategy and consider the incumbent. If 
he plays the equilibrium strategy, and if 4/)1(1 +<- qx t , he earns 
00
ˆ
1
P
-
=P
d
d
,  
where 0Pˆ denotes the profit in period t if 4/)3(1 +>- qx t and both sellers play the 
equilibrium strategy. Note that no other strategy can give him higher profits: when 
4/)1(1 +<- qx t  and the entrant plays the equilibrium strategy, the incumbent’s  maximum 
profits are 0. When 4/)3(1 +>- qx t and the entrant plays his equilibrium strategy, the 
incumbent’s maximum profits are 0Pˆ . Hence, no strategy can give higher profits than 
equilibrium strategy.   
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 Suppose now that the incumbent plays the equilibrium strategy and consider the 
entrant. When  he plays his equilibrium strategy, his profits are: 
 
d
d
-
P++-=P
1
ˆ
8
)1( 1
2
1
q
q ,  
where 1Pˆ denotes the profit in period t if 4/)3(1 +>- qx t  and both sellers play the 
equilibrium strategy. Note that if the incumbent plays the equilibrium strategy, the entrant 
can never earn higher per period profits than 1Pˆ . It is obviously true if 4/)3(1 +>- qx t . 
When 4/)1(1 +<- qx t , the maximum profit is 8/)1(
2+- qq . Observe that if 
4/)3(1 +>- qx t , the entrant can always earn q by setting qp
t =1 , which is not the optimal 
price.  Hence, 8/)1(ˆ 21 +->>P qqq . Hence, a strategy different than the equilibrium 
strategy will give either lower current profits, or lower future profits, or both. This shows that 
under the assumption of the market being covered, the proposed strategies form an 
equilibrium for any d .  
The next step shows that in the described equilibrium the market is covered. Note that 
when 101 £+
tt pp , the market in period t is covered. Everyone consumes one of the goods, if 
for all q  
 0)1( 11 ³-+-
t
t pxq qq or 0)1()1( 00 ³--+-
t
t pxq qq .  
This is surely true, if (but not only if) the sum of these two expressions is nonnegative,  
  0))(1( 0101 ³--++-
tt ppqq qq ,      
which, since 5.001 >> qq , is certainly the case if 101 £+
tt pp . It is easy to check that in 
the proposed equilibrium 101 £+
tt pp  if 5.0<tx . If 4/)3( +> qx t , the sum of 
equilibrium prices is 
100
19389 2
01
--++
=+
qqq
pp tt , which is obviously smaller than 1.   
 
Next, we show that no other outcome with a covered market can arise in an 
equilibrium. In any period two types of market shares can arise: 4/)1( +< qx t  or 
4/)3( +> qx t . Hence, several equilibrium outcomes are possible: 
i)  4/)1( +< qx t  for every 1-tx ; 
ii) 4/)3( +> qx t  for every 1-tx ; 
iii) 4/)3( +> qx t  if  4/)1(1 +<- qx t  and 4/)1( +< qx t  if 4/)3(1 +>- qx t ; 
iv) 4/)1( +< qx t  if 4/)1(1 +<- qx t  and 4/)3( +> qx t  if 4/)3(1 +>- qx t .  
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We have just shown that an equilibrium outcome described in (ii) exists. We consider 
now the other cases.  
Ad. i) The proof is similar to the analogous case in the proof of Proposition 3, where we 
showed that in this case the optimal e++-+= 8/)1( 201 qqpp
tt , while optimal 
e--++< qqpp tt 8/)1( 200 . Hence, the only equilibrium prices are 
e++-= 8/)1( 21 qqp
t  and 00 =
tp . At these prices, the entrant’s profits are 
 ÷
ø
öç
è
æ +
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ +
-
-
=P
4
1
8
)1(
1
1 2
1
qq
q
d
.  
which is lower than the profits that he can earn if he takes over the market and keeps a large 
market share, 
 tqq 1
2
1 1
8/)1( P
-
++-=P
d
d
,  
where qt >P1 . 
16 
The same reasoning rules out an equilibrium outcome of type (iv).  
Ad.(iii) In this case, the market share follows a cycle of the type: 
.etc.,..0,1,0 21 === ++ ttt xxx
17 Denote by 0'p and 1'p  equilibrium prices if 
4/)1(1 +<- qx t , and by 0''p  and 1''p  equilibrium prices if  4/)1(1 +>- qx t . The 
discounted profits and prices of both sellers are:  
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2
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+-+= qpp . 
This could be an equilibrium outcome if none of the sellers could increase his profits 
by playing a strategy leading to a different outcome. Consider the entrant. His profits in this 
equilibrium must be larger than what he can earn, given the price of the incumbent,  if  
4/)3( +> qx t  forever, i.e., 
4
)''1(8)3(3
max
1
'
1
' 01
2
112
1
1
ppqq
pp
p
p
-+-+++
-
+>
- d
d
d
. 
Similarly, the incumbent must earn higher profits than when  4/)1( +< qx t , i.e., 
 
                                                                 
16 If 4/)3( +> qtx , the entrant can always set the price q and keep the whole market, which is not optimal. 
17 See footnote 13 
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, 
which leads to a contradiction for every d . Hence, market share cycles of this type cannot be 
an equilibrium outcome.  
Therefore, we have shown that the only possible equilibrium outcome with a covered 
market is one with 4/)3( +> qx t  for every 1-tx .      
Finally, we show that it is always optimal for at least one of the sellers to cover the 
market, and hence no equilibrium with a non-covered market exists. We consider several 
initial market shares:  
i) 4/)1(1 +<- qx t .
19 We show that if 35.0 1 ££ q  it is always optimal for the entrant to 
cover the market.  We consider  several cases:  
a) 18/)1( 20 ³+-+ qqp
t . Suppose 35.0 1 ££ q . Then, if 11 =
tp , the entrant will have 
the whole market and earn 11 =P
t , while if 11 >
tp ,  11 <P
t  and the market share will be 
less than 1. Hence, 11 =
tp  is better both for present and future profits.  
b)  8/)1(16/)1( 20
2 ++-<<-+ qqpqq t  .  
Then, 8/)1(' 2011 +-+==P qqpp
tt  is higher than the maximum profit that can be 
achieved when 8/)1(' 201 +-+> qqpp
t ,  and it also results in larger market share20. Hence, 
8/)1(' 201 +-+= qqpp
t , at which price the market is covered, is optimal for current and 
future profits.  
ii) 4/)3(1 +>- qx t . We show that if 35.0 0 ££ q , it is always optimal for the incumbent to 
cover the market. We consider several cases.  
                                                                 
18 qp
ppqq
p +=
-+-+++
01 ''4
)0''11(8
2)3(3
 qpp += 01 '' if and qp
ppqqq
p -=
+--++-
1'4
)01'(8
2)1(3
0  if qpp -= 1'0  
19 The proof for 5.014/)1( <-<+ txq is analogous.  
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a) 18/)3(1 21 ³+-+ qp
t . Then, if 35.0 0 ££ q , for the same reasons as for the 
incumbent above  it is optimal for the incumbent to set 10 =
tp  and cover the market.   
b) 6/)14(8/)3( 21
2 ++<<+ qqpq t . Here, 8/)3(1 210 +-+= qpp
tt  gives the 
highest current profits and the highest market share, 21 hence it is optimal.  
c) 6/)14( 21 ++< qqp
t . Since qpp tt -< 10 (else the incumbent has zero profits now 
and 0 market share in at the beginning of the next period),  16/)1('' 210 <-<+ qpp
t . 
Hence, the market is covered. This shows that it is always optimal for at least one of the 
sellers to cover the market, which completes the proof.      /// 
 
Proof of Proposition 5.  We show that no pure strategy Markov equilibrium with a covered 
market exists. Moreover, it is always optimal for at least one of the sellers to cover the 
market. Hence, no pure-strategy equilibrium with a non-covered market exists.    
We consider all potential equilibrium outcomes with the market covered and show that 
none of them can arise in an equilibrium. We begin with the case 0=d , and then  extend the 
argument to higher d .  
Assume that 0=d  and consider two types of initial market shares: 4/)3(1 +>- qx t  
and 4/)1(1 +<- qx t .
22 
i) 0=d  and 4/)3(1 +>- qx t . We have shown in the proof of Proposition 4 that a 
necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium is qq ˆ> . Otherwise, there does not 
equilibrium prices at which the incumbent would prefer having a small market share to taking 
over the market. Hence, if qq ˆ< , there is no pure strategy equilibrium.  
ii) 0=d  and 4/)1(1 +<- qx t . We have shown earlier
23  that when 223 ->q , the entrant 
always finds it optimal to take over the market. Therefore, this must be the equilibrium 
outcome. Then, 4/)3( +> qx t ,  and in the next period there is no pure strategy equilibrium. 
Hence, when 223 ->q , there does not exist a pure strategy Markov equilibrium. 
Therefore, an equilibrium could only exist if 223 -<q , and the outcome would have to be 
4/)1( +< qx t  in every period. We show now that such an equilibrium does not exist.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
20 see footnote 8. 
21 When 6/)142(1'' ++> qqp , the profit function is decreasing if 8/
2)3(11''0 +-+> qp
tp .  
22 Since 4/)3(14/)1( +£-£+ qtxq can never occur, we do not consider it. . 
23 see footnote 8. 
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In an equilibrium, both sellers must optimize given the other's strategy. The profit 
functions are      
4
)(8)1(1 01
2
11
tt
tt ppqqqp
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=P ; 
4
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2
00
tt
tt ppqqqp
+--++-
=P . 
We obtain now optimal response functions of the sellers.  
a) incumbent. The profit function is concave and increasing at the lower boundary of its 
domain. Hence, two optima are possible:  
· an interior solution, given by the first order condition 
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Solving for tp0 , we obtain 
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· a corner solution, qpp tt -= 10 .  
b) entrant. The profit function of the entrant is concave when ÷÷ø
ö
ççè
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01
q
qpp tt  
and convex otherwise. Besides, it is decreasing at the upper boundary of its domain, qp t +0 . 
Hence, two optimum values could arise:  
· an interior solution, given by the first order condition 
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Solving for tp1 , we get 
18
66)1()1(12110 0
2
0
2
1
tt
t pqqqpqqp
--++++-+-
= . 
· A corner solution at the lower boundary of the domain,  
8
)1( 2
01
+-+= qqpp tt . 
Since in an equilibrium 4/)1( +< qx t , the optimal responses of both sellers must be 
interior. Denote the interior optimal prices by )( 0
*
1 pp  and )( 1
*
0 pp .
24  
                                                                 
24 Note that for the entrant a global optimum may be different (corner solution).  
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 Figure A. 1 shows the interior optimal prices as functions of the competitor's price.  
The figure is meant to help understanding how the proof works. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The bold curve represents the incumbent's reaction function, )( 1
*
0 pp . The single line 
represents solutions to the entrant's optimization problem: the left, curved one is the interior 
solution, )( 0
*
1 pp , while the right, straight line is the corner solution, qpp
tt += 01 . Note 
that for some 0p  both solutions exist. In that interval only the solution that gives higher 
profits is relevant.    
We have shown that an equilibrium with a corner solution does not exist. Hence, to 
prove that there is no equilibrium, it is enough to show that )( 1
*
0 pp  and )( 0
*
1 pp  do not 
cross. The proof consists of several steps. We show that    
a)  Point A lies above point B; 
b)  Point D lies to the right of point C; 
c) )( 0
*
1 pp  is concave in 0p , and therefore all values of )( 0
*
1 pp  lie above the straight line 
connecting A and C;  
d) )( 1
*
0 pp  is concave in 1p . Hence, its inverse, )( 0
1*
0 pp
- , is convex in 0p . Therefore, all 
values of the inverse reaction function lie below the straight line connecting B and D. 
e) (a) to (d) imply that the curve representing the interior optimum of the entrant lies above 
the reaction curve of the incumbent, and hence the two curves do not cross. This shows that a 
pure strategy equilibrium does not exist.  
ad. a)  We show that the 1p  coordinate of A is always larger than 1p  coordinate of B. That 
is, )0()0( 1*0
*
1
-> pp  
The incumbent's optimal response is equal to 0, if  
0
18
66)3()3(1236 1
2
1
2
0 =
+---++--
=
tt
t pqqpqqp ,  
 
C 
D 
A 
B 
  p0 
Figure A.1  
 p1 
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which is true if 8/)1( 21 +-= qqp  (and for all lower )1p . Hence, 
8/)1()0( 21*0 +-=
- qqp . 25 
The entrant's optimal response to 0 is   
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6)1()1(110
)0(
22
*
1
qqqqq
p
-+++-+-
= .  
Comparing these two values of 1p  we see that )0()0(
1*
0
*
1
-> pp for every relevant q. 
b) Here we show that the highest 0p  for which the entrant's interior optimum exists, 0p , is 
lower than  ))(( 0
*
1
*
0 ppp . We know that when q
q
p -+>
6
)1( 2
0 , the entrant's profit 
function is always decreasing, and hence there is no interior solution. On the other hand, 
when q
q
p -+<
6
)1( 2
0 , the profit function is increasing at the lower boundary so that an 
interior solution exists.  Therefore,  q
q
p -+=
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0  and  
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Comparing these two values, we see that ))(( 0
*
1
*
0 ppp is larger than 0p  for all relevant q.   
c) )( 10 pp is concave.  
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 for all relevant q  
d) )( 01 pp is concave 
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pqq
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 for all relevant q.  
This shows that when 0=d , there does not exist a pure strategy Markov equilibrium. 
We now extend the argument to the case when 0>d . Since any period two types of market 
shares can arise, 4/)1( +< qx t  or 4/)3( +> qx t , several market outcomes are possible:  
i)  4/)1( +< qx t  for every 1-tx ; 
ii) 4/)3( +> qx t  for every 1-tx ; 
iii) 4/)3( +> qx t   if  4/)1(1 +<- qx t  and 4/)1( +< qx t  if 4/)3(1 +>- qx t ; 
                                                                 
25 If 08/2)1( <+- qq , 0)1(*0 >pp  for any 1p . Hence, the beginning of the incumbent’s reaction curve lies 
obviously below the entrant’ reaction curve. 
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iv) 4/)1( +< qx t    if 4/)1(1 +<- qx t   and 4/)3( +> qx t  if 4/)3(1 +>- qx t .  
Ad.i) In this case, the total profits of sellers are: t11 1
1 P
-
=P
d
 and t00 1
1 P
-
=P
d
, where 
t
1P  and 
t
0P  are per-period profits if 4/)1(1 +<- qx t  and 4/)1( +< qx t . Their 
maximization leads to the same optimal responses as maximization of t1P  and 
t
0P . Since in 
that case no pure strategy equilibrium exists, it also does not exist when 0>d . Ad. ii) The 
argument is similar to that in i). Ad iii). Follows from i) and ii). Ad. iv) The same argument 
as in the proof of proposition 4 shows that a pure strategy Markov equilibrium with market 
share cycle does not exist.      
We have shown that none of the possible outcomes can arise in the equilibrium. Hence, 
if qq ˆ0 <£  there does not exist a pure strategy Markov equilibrium with a covered market. A 
similar argument as in the Proposition 4 shows that it is always optimal to cover the market.  
Hence, there does not exist an equilibrium with not covered market. This completes the 
proof.               /// 
 
 
 
 
 
